Politics

WikiLeaks: A gusher of information for no apparent public purpose

The latest destructive flood of WikiLeaks looks like a chance for Julian Assange to grab the spotlight.

WikiLeaks: A gusher of information for no apparent public purpose
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Ted Van Dyk

The latest destructive flood of WikiLeaks looks like a chance for Julian Assange to grab the spotlight.

The strange case of WikiLeaks' founder Julian Assange, and the  publication of 250,000 U.S. diplomatic cables on the WikiLeaks website,  has captured public attention at all levels. Assange, reportedly hiding  out in Great Britain, is an Australian wanted in Sweden on rape and  sexual assault charges, which he asserts are more associated with his  massive document dump than with his alleged violations. He has gone so  far as to suggest the United States is attempting to assassinate him.

What is going on here and what happens next?
 
There have been related disclosures of confidential information in the past, but most have been  pre-Internet and not so quickly disseminated globally. Some also have  been associated with diplomatic cables.
 
The United States, which had been neutral in World War I, was drawn into  that conflict in part because of the public surfacing of a so-called  Zimmermann Telegram — a purported German diplomatic cable promising  Mexico great concessions if it entered the war on the German side. Most analysts today agree that the Zimmermann Telegram was  in fact a clever British fake, which helped turn U.S. opinion in favor of intervening on the French-British side. And readers of World War II histories are aware of the many phony documents and messages employed by all sides to mislead their adversaries during that conflict.
 
Then there are the multiple examples of U.S. whistleblowers who, after the fact, published information that had been secret at the time they received it.

Their advocates presented the whistleblowers as heroes of their time. The reality, however, was more complicated in each case.
 
Chambers, it turned out, was a true-believer type who turned from Communism to devout Catholicism. Moreover, he had murky sexual involvements with some of the subjects of his accusations. Agee had been in trouble at the CIA because of a drinking problem, compulsive womanizing among U.S. embassy female personnel, and financial difficulties. Ellsberg had been a Pentagon analyst for many years before he decided to publicly release documents with which he had been working. He, too, had a complex personal life and was a notorious attention seeker.

Wilson and Plame, too, sought public attention. It was well known before Wilson's New York Times piece that Saddam  Hussein did not, in fact, possess a nuclear-weapons capability. Plame's alleged "outing" as a CIA staffer was no big deal. She was  posted at CIA's Langley headquarters and not overseas. The identities of  CIA headquarters staff members are about as secret in Washington, D.C., as the  list of taxicab companies in the phone book. The previously obscure  Wilson and Plame have parlayed their roles in the matter into a Vanity Fair photo  spread, big lecture fees, and even a recent movie glamorizing the  episode.
 
Chambers was a private citizen when he made his disclosures. Agee,  Ellsberg, Wilson, and Plame, however, were past or present U.S.  government officials who knew they were breaching security rules which  they had explicitly accepted as part of their jobs.
 
Nonetheless, did their disclosures serve the public interest? Chambers' accusations, it turned out, were mainly true. But they fed a McCarthyist surge in the nation's capital, which led to accusations against many who were innocent. Agee's allegations about CIA conduct in Latin America also had substance to them. Although they were not surprising in themselves, they jeopardized the lives and safety of many colleagues Agee left behind in the CIA. Ellsberg and The New York Times did a real public service with his documents. Released in volume, and covering  a long period, they disclosed a long pattern of U.S.  government mistakes and misjudgments in Vietnam. Wilson and Plame were split-second footnotes in a massive information flow pointing to the same conclusions regarding alleged Iraqi nuclear programs.
 
Diplomatic cables are a different chapter in the story of confidential information disclosures. Media commentators, in discussing the WikiLeaks matter, have shown a  curious ignorance about what these cables are and are not.
 
Thousands of such cables go to and from Washington, D.C. and U.S. embassies daily. They cover such diverse subjects as milk production in the host country, military capabilities and troop  movements, capital flows, conversations with government officials and  private citizens, and assessments of foreign-government intentions and  objectives. From time to time they also include assessments of foreign  leaders' characters and behavior patterns. (Hence Secretary of State  Hillary Clinton's joking remark that foreign counterparts had told her,  "You should see what our cables say about you.") Yes, outright U.S.  spying takes place, just as foreign partners — even our closest  allies — spy on us. But much of this is not contained in the daily  cable flow.  
 
The current WikiLeaks disclosures include cable excerpts dealing with corruption among Afghan and African leaders and the alpha-male habitudes of Russian leader Valery Putin. No surprises there. Brief embarrassments maybe, but no more.
 
The potential problems lie elsewhere. Are foreign governments or intelligence services inserting their own mischievous messages (like the notorious Zimmermann Telegram) into the WikiLeaks flow? The next WikiLeaks dump will reportedly deal with financial and economic  activity undertaken by private banks and corporations in Western  countries. Will the data be real, or calculated misinformation?
 
Back in the ancient past I served as a Pentagon intelligence analyst and then in U.S. Executive Branch positions where I saw the daily cable flow. But back then the information was distributed in hard copy — in written form, to a closely controlled list of people who were cleared to receive it. Now (and in particular, since the formation of the Department of  Homeland Security and the mandate that information be shared widely and  electronically) access is wider and easier — and leaks are harder to trace.
 
I am not among those who view the unauthorized release of information as something which simply should not happen. I recall in particular two instances early in 1965, when as assistant  to Vice President Humphrey I read incoming cables which I regarded as  particularly wrongheaded. If they had been generally released at the  time, they might have been met with more skepticism, and big mistakes could  have been avoided.
 
First, an incoming cable from National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, who was in Vietnam at the time, advocated massive retaliations and strikes against North Vietnam in the wake of small-scale Viet Cong attacks on a U.S. barracks at Pleiku. I wondered, What was Bundy thinking? These were the kinds of skirmishes that happen in this kind of conflict and were no reason to escalate to general war. But that is exactly what happened when, in followup, President Johnson took Bundy's advice and launched massive air attacks against North Vietnam.
 
Later I saw incoming cables from U.S. Ambassador Tapley Bennett in the Dominican Republic. He warned that a pending coup there could result in establishment in the D.R. of a Castro-allied regime. Bennett was wrong. The contest was between two factions, neither of which had Castro ties. LBJ, however, bought into Bennett's thesis, and U.S. Marines were sent to the Dominican Republic, reestablishing a gunboat-diplomacy tradition that our Latin American partners thought we had abandoned.
 
The WikiLeaks documents are not in this category. The dump is so massive, and so undifferentiated, that it could only have been undertaken for destructive purposes. The same  will be true if other countries' documents, or private  financial/economic information, come flooding onto the Internet.
 
Who knows what Assange's motives may be? They may involve nothing  more than his personal desire for celebrity. In any case, there is  today no equivalent of the New York Times editorial board which, in  1971, considered the matter long and thoroughly before deciding to  publish the Pentagon Papers. For good or ill, the WikiLeaks information  is coming in gushers, with no telling whether it is true, false, or  in-between.

Ted Van Dyk

By Ted Van Dyk

Ted Van Dyk has been active in national policy and politics since 1961, serving in the White House and State Department and as policy director of several Democratic presidential campaigns. He is auth